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Transport policy in developed countries has for a long time included the need to increase the usage of public transport. The availability of
‘good’ public transport is a major strand in policies to achieve greater usage of public transport and to influence modal shift. However, ‘good’ public
transport has many attributes including financial sustainability and the provision of quality services efficiently.
This paper addresses two related themes relevant to the provision of ‘good’ public transport with particular reference to the provision of urban
bus services in the UK. The first theme examines the way in which financial stability, quality and efficiency can be measured by urban transport
providers:  in this context the paper considers the theoretical and practical issues of applying benchmarking by an urban transport provider. The
second theme considers the economic framework in which differences in behaviour of public and private firms and differences in legislative frame-
works can be a means of explaining the disparity in attitude by transport providers to the potential benefits of the benchmarking tool.
Using available benchmarking experience, the paper evaluates the relevance of the theory and identifies key attributes for developing more
successful performance measurement for public transport operators in the future. This is important because understanding what is best quality perfor-
mance and attempting to move towards industry best is one of the most secure ways of ensuring the provision of quality services in a financially
stable environment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Transport policy in developed countries has for a
long time included the need to increase the usage of pub-
lic transport. The identified motivation for this has
changed over the years – from a desire to reduce the need
to control the number of cars as shown, in the UK, by
the seminal works of Buchannan and Plowden1 to envi-
ronmental reasons and the specific reduction of conges-
tion as shown again, in the UK, by the 10 year plan*
published by the Department of Transport2. The availabil-
ity of ‘good’ public transport is a major strand in poli-
cies to achieve greater usage of public transport and to
influence modal shift. However, ‘good’ public transport
has many attributes including financial sustainability and
the provision of quality services efficiently.
This paper addresses two related themes relevant to
the provision of ‘good’ public transport with particular
reference to the provision of urban bus services in the UK.
The first theme examines the way in which financial sta-
bility, quality and efficiency can be measured by urban
transport providers:  in this context the paper considers
the theoretical and practical issues of applying bench-
marking by an urban transport provider. The second
theme considers the economic framework in which dif-
ferences in behaviour of public and private firms and dif-
ferences in legislative frameworks can be a means of
explaining the disparity in attitude by transport provid-
ers to the potential benefits of the benchmarking tool.
This is important because understanding what is best
quality performance and attempting to move towards in-
dustry best is one of the most secure ways of ensuring
the provision of quality services in a financially stable
environment.
2. MEASURING QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY
IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT
There is a plethora of management models and
ideas which can be used in a business context to improve
business performance3. Benchmarking has been a key tool
in the business improvement armoury for many years4.
* The opening statement of this document states ‘Our strategy for trans-
port is to tackle congestion and pollution by improving all types of
transport – rail and road, public and private –in ways that increase
choice. It is a strategy for investment in the future to create prosperity and
a better environment.’
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Benchmarking is a way of measuring how good the busi-
ness is at what it does, making a quantitative statement
as to whether their performance is as good as other busi-
nesses and using this information to improve the business
process. In short, benchmarking is a tool for searching
for industry best practice, leading to improvement in
performance. It is an on-going technique for measuring and
improving processes against the best that can be identified.
It requires data gathering, goal setting and analysis.
Benchmarking is concerned with facts in contrast to other
key management tools, such as balanced scorecards, which
also include more subjective elements relating to business
aspirations. Benchmarking can be widely applied and can
cover all aspects of measurable activity:  in a urban bus
context, benchmarking could cover both inputs (internal
efficiency) and outputs (revenue and passenger responses).
After participating in benchmarking, the organisa-
tion will have gained an in-depth knowledge of itself. The
measurement process provided by benchmarking provides
a baseline data set for improvements and for target set-
ting on a basis which can be understood throughout the
organisation. The areas for potential improvement are
identified, target values (perhaps with intermediate mile-
stones) can be set and there will be an estimate of the
value gain for the organisation. The team building
achieved in the benchmarking activity will provide the
platform for the action teams which achieve the improve-
ments. Benchmarking is a key step in a continuous im-
provement process although it will not add value in itself
– it is the catalyst to change. Value is only added through
achieving real improvements.
Figure 1 shows the generic methodology of the bench-
marking process. Benchmarking in general is a cyclical
process  in which one complete cycle of benchmarking
involves nine stages. In the context of a public transport
operator, the process would commence with the definition
and agreement of the factors which are critical to the suc-
cess of an individual company (stage 1). This is followed
by the development of appropriate performance measures,
known as indicators (stage 2). These indicators are then
measured by individual operators (stage 3). Benchmarking
enables an operator to compare indicators with other op-
erators (stage 4), so that areas of relative strength and weak-
ness can be determined (stage 5). Having reviewed all
relevant business processes, individual operators can de-
cide the operational aspects which would be commercially
valuable to improve (stage 6). An operator will work with
at least one other partner who has been identified as being
best in the selected areas of operation (stage 7). The op-
erator is then able to plan and implement improvements
to the business (stage 8). Benchmarking in general is a per-
manent, on-going process: having implemented improve-
ments, the indicators need to be monitored (stage 9).
Furthermore, since the business is not static, the operator
will need to review all indicators periodically, which will
require starting once again with a review of the critical suc-
cess factors for the business (stage 1). In practice, opera-
tors do not need to complete the full cycle (although this
would bring most benefits) and could carry out internal
benchmarking (finishing at stage 3) or compare figures
with an anonymous database (finishing at stage 6).
The critical aspect of learning from best practice in
a benchmarking context is that this should be undertaken
within a framework in which participants are not com-
peting for the same business. In practice, much learning
from best practice will come from intra-industry compari-
son but there are processes or activities where inter-in-
dustry comparison is not only valid but desirable6.
1. Define and agree on 
critical success factors 
of business
2. Develop indicators to 
measure performance
3. Measure indicators for 
an individual operator
4. Compare performance 
with that of others
9. Monitor performance
8. Plan and implement 
improvements
7. Learn best practice 
from benchmark 
partners
5. Identify areas to be 
improved
6. Review relevant 
business processes
Fig. 1  Benchmarking network methodology chart5
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3. BENCHMARKING IN THE PUBLIC
TRANSPORT SECTOR
One of the earliest interests in performance mea-
surement was noted in the passenger transport sector
over twenty years ago with the investigation by the
OECD. The OECD Road Research Programme under-
took an examination of the key issues to be considered
in developing a technically sound approach to evalua-
tion of performance, using various ‘packages’ of indi-
cators. The resulting report outlines a clear conceptual
basis for development of system-wide indicators in two
categories of interest to this paper: efficiency and effec-
tiveness7. Effectiveness is concerned with the results of
the service, while efficiency is concerned with the
means of achieving these results.
The report identifies eight groups of users with
each having differing needs for performance indicators:
public transport managers; municipal managers; policy
makers; regional planners; street traffic system manag-
ers; central, national and state governments; public
transport users; and the research community. Data re-
quirements and sources are identified and the pros and
cons of manual versus automatic data collection systems
described. The recommended set of performance indi-
cators required for the purposes of (a) service planning,
(b) internal assessment, (c) comparison of different op-
erations and (d) more global assessment are outlined. In
addition, some applications for each indicator are noted,
together with advice of the frequency at which the mea-
sure should be reported. However, despite this early
work, no evidence of it being put into practice in a sus-
tained way has been identified in the public transport
sector. This is possibly due to the way that the report
highlighted the difficulties of measuring indicators in a
consistent way and suggested, as a solution, that the
measurement should therefore be used within a firm
over a period of time rather than as an inter-firm com-
parison, i.e. stopping at stage 3 in the cyclical process
(Figure 1).
Since this report, there have been a number of ini-
tiatives spearheaded by the European Commission (EC)
framework research programme. The ISOTOPE (Im-
proved Structure and Organisation for Transport Opera-
tions of Passengers in Europe) project (1995-1997)
developed a set of key performance indicators for differ-
ent types of public transport operators and a number of
cities within the context of identifying the most effective
and efficient organisational structures for urban public
transport. This was followed by the QUATTRO (Qual-
ity approach in tendering urban public transport opera-
tions) project (1996-1998). This project was designed to
aid public authorities define and monitor quality in the
provision of tendering and contracting work and recom-
mended benchmarking as the process for quality enhance-
ment measurement. In addition, QUATTRO worked with
the experts from the European Committee for Standardisation
(CEN). In March 1999 CEN issued draft recommenda-
tions for the definition, targeting and measurement of
service quality (TC 320 WG 5). The standard itself is
not intended to be compulsory or to set targets - the pur-
pose of the CEN recommendations is to standardise in-
dicators and terminology to promote a quality approach
to public transport operations and focus interest on cus-
tomers’ needs and expectations. The CEN standard pub-
lication is now live and is incorporated into national
standards where appropriate8.
Despite this background of interest and promotion,
there has been little performance measurement in the
public transport sector. Notable exceptions are the
CoMET and Nova Benchmarking Clubs facilitated by
the Railway Technology Strategy Centre at Imperial
College, London, UK, involving 16 urban railway op-
erators from around the world. The CoMET Club of op-
erators was established in 1995 and it comprises BVG
(Berlin, Germany), MTRC (Hong Kong), LUL (London,
UK), STC (Mexico City), MoM (Moscow, Russia),
NYCT (New York, USA), RATP Metro and RER (Paris,
France), MSP (Sao Paulo, Brazil) and TRTA (Tokyo,
Japan). The Nova Club of urban railways was estab-
lished in 1998 and consists of SPT (Glasgow, UK),
KCRC (Hong Kong), Metropolitano de Lisboa (Lisbon,
Portugal), Metro de Madrid (Madrid, Spain), Nexus
(Newcastle, UK), AS Oslo Sporveier (Oslo, Norway)
and SMRT (Singapore).
For road passenger transport, one of the first Euro-
pean initiatives towards benchmarking in public transport
was the project for developing and realising competitive
transportation services (KiPa) in Finland. The project was
led by Bussialan Kehittämispalvelut Oy, a development
company owned by the Finnish Bus and Coach Associa-
tion. This initiative was applied first to inter-urban bus
services as an extension of work based on the road haul-
age sector and subsequently to a number of more local
bus operators by TransControl, a company who devel-
oped and extended the KiPa work for this purpose. The
TransControl benchmarking methodology is a process
whereby a public transport company is evaluated by an
external expert using a comprehensive set of indicators
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that measure the quality of the operator’s performance.
However, it relies heavily on the firm not only wanting
to carry out benchmarking but also having the financial
resources to employ the experts to do it.
It is against this background that the most important
project for this paper, the EC EQUIP project, is set. EQUIP
was concerned with the benchmarking of efficiency in all
modes of local public transport. Specifically, EQUIP dealt
with the “internal” efficiency of the public transport op-
erator – in other words, the capability to achieve planned
outputs within performance targets, and the optimisation
of the use of resources to achieve this. “Quality” of ser-
vice and customer satisfaction were considered as “exter-
nal factors” and were only considered within EQUIP where
they had internal relevance. This was not to say that these
factors were somehow less important – it was simply that
the external factors were well considered in other work as
shown above, whereas EQUIP focused on the operator.
Unlike any previous study, EQUIP was concerned to pro-
duce a self assessment handbook so that operators could
carry out the measurement themselves and not need to rely
on bringing in external experts.
The major, and most tangible, output of EQUIP is
the Handbook which was developed through an iterative
process with deep participation by the industry sector. An
extensive search9 was carried out to identify relevant in-
dicators which were then refined and clustered, and sup-
ported by a comprehensive measurement methodology.
The first version of the Handbook was developed and
used by the EQUIP Network of operators for self-assess-
ment. This provided validation and feedback to produce
the final version for public release which has been ap-
proved by the European Commission. This is discussed
in more detail after the next section which provides the
theoretical framework for this paper.
4. THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
Two issues are considered in this section. First, a
synopsis is provided of the economic theory – principally
derived from principal agent theory – which gives predic-
tions about the way in which ownership drives manage-
ment and workers. The intention is to explore how this
theory can give a potential insight into the way in which
management information and the benefits of performance
management, using a tool such as benchmarking could
be viewed by companies with different ownership struc-
ture. Second, this section examines the question as to
whether the type of regulation under which the public
transport operates has an impact on their desire to con-
duct performance management techniques such as bench-
marking. The theory is exemplified by a transport –
particularly road transport – context as this is the focus
of this paper.
4.1 Principle-agent problems
The principle agent problem is concerned with
asymmetries of information between two parties who are
in an established contractual agreement. This could, for
example, be the bilateral relationship between the owner
of the firm (principal) and the manager (agent) where
asymmetries of information occur because the agent has
specific and more detailed knowledge than the principal
about the opportunities available to the firm and the prin-
cipal will only partially be able to observe the effort the
agent or manager puts into the job. An understanding of
the way in which these information asymmetries arise can
lead to the parties trying to design contracts that mitigate
the difficulties that these principal-agent problems bring
and this has been the basis of the growing literature on
Organisational Architecture for firms10.
In practice there are two types of information prob-
lem that can occur in these situations. The first is the type
of problem that occurs from hidden actions, sometimes
known as moral hazard when, for example, the owner
cannot observe how hard his manager works. The sec-
ond is the type of problem which arises from hidden in-
formation, as illustrated by the way in which the agent
may have more detailed knowledge about available op-
portunities for the firm than the principal. Whilst most
situations will involve some degree of both information
asymmetries, it is worth distinguishing them here to iden-
tify their separate impacts.
For firms, the amount workers produce will be a
function of a range of factors – some factors relating to
efficiency and some relating to effort or enthusiasm. If
an owner observes a particular productivity, how can it
be determined whether greater enthusiasm on behalf of
the managers would improve productivity or not?  The
basis of this problem is that because an owner cannot ob-
serve fully the effort and efficiency of its management,
the management has an incentive and the scope to pur-
sue their own objectives rather than those of the owner.
Of course, if full information was available, there would
be no such scope. This paper is particularly concerned
with information asymmetries which arise when an owner
(principal) employs a manager (agent) who subsequently
knows more about the opportunities available to the firm
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than the owner) as these are pertinent to the behaviour
of the agent*.
The next stage is to consider what differences might
occur if the public transport operator is in private or pub-
lic ownership?  These are considered in turn.
Private Ownership
Private ownership can take one of two forms – a
firm could be owned by a single owner, as with many
small public transport operators in the private sector or
it could be a company which has many shareholders, such
as Stagecoach Group or Go-Ahead Group in the UK**.
This is important because principal-agent theory suggests
that some sort of monitoring by the principal will be re-
quired if the agent is to be persuaded to behave in the
principal’s best interests by maximising their return.
Monitoring by principals is usually undertaken by the de-
sign of an incentive scheme that meets their needs whilst
recognising that agents, given the incentive scheme, will
behave in a self interested way. The monitoring cannot
be too restrictive because to work it must be sufficiently
attractive for agents to want to undertake the venture with
the principal. Clearly, if there are many shareholders
rather than one owner, this monitoring task is more dif-
ficult and perhaps less efficient, especially if different
shareholders have different objectives.
Another aspect of the difference between single or
many owners (as in shareholders) is that, in the latter case,
there is a well defined procedure for takeover. Because
shares are marketable, the size distribution of shareholdings
can change quickly as a result of shareholder buying and
selling decisions. This means that it is possible for a
single shareholder to seek to buy all the shares by mak-
ing a takeover bid which, if successful, would concen-
trate ownership and eliminate the externalities associated
with having many owners. The perceived threat of take-
overs is regarded as one of the incentives for agents not
to deviate too far from the principal’s interests since the
single owner can much more effectively monitor and this
would be associated with loss of control for the agent.
However, the empirical evidence, at least for the UK, is
not unambiguous about the strength of the takeover threat
in making agents behave. This is attributed, perhaps most
importantly, to the way in which shareholders per se do
not have much influence over acquisition decisions and
so again the agents have the upper hand to try and align
their own interests at the expense of the principal’s.
A variation on the takeover constraint is the threat
of bankruptcy. The argument here is that agents would
lose the (ultimate) managerial control of the firm if it were
to become bankrupt. Clearly there are stark differences
to both principals and agents between takeovers and
bankruptcy although the economic analysis is somewhat
similar. There is an extensive literature on this subject,
both theoretical and empirical. In the UK, it was pro-
voked and illustrated by the embracing nature of the UK
privatisation programme11.
Public Ownership
Public ownership, like private ownership, can take
several forms. However, all forms of public ownership
have a common element – that of effective single owner-
ship*. Given the preceding section, it might be thought that
this would make the analysis easier. Unfortunately, whilst
single ownership is a simplifying aspect, public ownership
is complicated by additional principal-agent relationships
which are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Typically there are two different types of public of-
ficials involved in monitoring as principals:  the elected
officials appropriate to ownership (whether this be at na-
tional or local level) and the public servant or bureaucrat
(civil servant or local government officer). The agents are
the managers of the publicly owned company. It should
not be forgotten that both the managers and the employ-
ees of the public company are also likely to be ‘owners’
in the sense of being members of the general public and
this is a further complication.
The relationship between the electorate and the poli-
tician has a key influence:  politicians develop ‘egotisti-
cal’, short-term objectives in the form of a desire for
re-election. This leads to their favouring special interest
groups against less vocal stakeholders** and against po-
tentially superior long-term objectives. Traditionally, it
was believed that the threat of re-election would be
* These are usually referred to as post-contract information asymme-
tries.
** The UK Transport Act of 1985 made provision for the deregulation of
local bus transport and for bus companies then in public ownership to
be transferred to the private sector. Subsequently, a number of large
(private) bus groups have emerged of which 6 (Arriva, First, Go Ahead,
national Express Group, Southern Vectis) have been floated on the UK
Stock Exchange and thus may have many shareholder owners.
* This is an oversimplification. In practice, a wide range of stakeholders ‘own’
public companies. However, there is a distinct difference between the
general public’s ownership of a public company and the shareholder’s
ownership of a private company:  this is reflected in the relationship between
the principal and the agent. In the former case, the stakeholders devolve the
principal role to the elected representatives whereas in the latter case,
shareholders can have a much more direct influence on agents.
**A stakeholder on any issue represents different individuals, organized
groups, or informal, interested parties that the expert source or sources
believe have in interest in determining or preferences regarding the
outcome of the any specific policy question.
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enough to ensure that politicians acted in the best inter-
ests of the stakeholders but this does depend on voters
being well informed, not only about the decisions made
by politicians on their behalf but also on the outcome of
these decisions. In practice this is another source of in-
formation asymmetry as voters express their views over
a whole range of issues, not just the management of a
single public company. This means the incentive (by vot-
ers) to acquire the information on which to judge their
elected representatives in relation to this single company
is not strong. This is compounded by the way in which
managers and workers in the public company will be vot-
ers and so there are asymmetries of information within
the population of voters*.
For the public company, their second principal is the
civil servant or local government official as it is likely that
the bureaucrat will be concerned with the detail of the
monitoring. The post of bureaucrat does not suffer from
the lack of tenure inherent in the role of an elected politi-
cian and this is therefore less likely to explain their
behaviour towards monitoring. Research suggests that it
is the size of budget and economic rent which accrues to
the bureaucrat which has more influence12. The activities
of the bureaucrats will be overseen by their political mas-
ters:  if budget is the only factor, theory suggests that the
outcome can be very detrimental with significantly in-
creased unit costs. This suggests more direct monitoring
of bureaucratic activity is also required. However, from the
politician’s point of view this is unlikely to improve their
own standpoint: bureaucrats normally have better informa-
tion about the public company than their political masters
and the factors which make bureaucrats feel better (size
of budget, size of department) are likely, other things be-
ing equal, to enhance the welfare of the politician. This is
perhaps also the reason why bureaucrats prefer direct in-
terference in public company management rather than the
‘arm’s length’ guidance that was a feature of many com-
panies when first brought into the public sector13.
Overlaying all these relationships are the complexi-
ties of the stakeholder map of a typical publicly owned
transport (or, more generally, service based) company.
This is alluded to in the opening paragraph of this sec-
tion and partially illustrated by some of the agent-princi-
pal relationships already discussed. Stakeholder maps
may well take different forms in different countries and/
or different institutional environments. Typically the high-
est Management Board of the company will have repre-
sentatives of stakeholder groups (including elected rep-
resentatives where appropriate) in addition to managers.
This immediately increases the numbers of principals for
whom a separate principal-agent relationship will exist
with the company and thus inevitably leads to a more
complex principal-agent structure for public companies
as compared with private companies. A consequence is
that the definition of good performance will be more
multi-dimensional in this context to reflect the different
objectives of the stakeholder groups.
4.2 Institutional and regulatory framework
It is widely accepted that governments have policy
options which involve a trade off between efficiency cri-
teria and equity criteria in evaluating changes which af-
fect the performance of sectors of the economy or the
whole economy. From a regulatory point of view, there
appear to be no robust reason for having a system of
quantity regulation for much of public transport opera-
tions (the exception being the provision of rail infrastruc-
ture where for many reasons, a single operator may be
necessary)14. Competition in the market is sufficient to
generate allocative efficiency15. This discussion does not
relate to safety regulation which is clearly necessary*.
The market for public transport services has moved
from being largely regulated at the beginning of the 1980s
to being largely deregulated in the 21st century. In the UK,
road public transport is unregulated (outside London)16.
Operators can register all services for operation without
subsidy. Services which are not provided commercially and
which are deemed necessary are provided by tender where
operators compete for the right to supply services (some-
times called off the road competition) at a (usually) fixed
price. At the other extreme, public transport operations can
benefit from a ‘block’ form of subsidy whereby the ‘prof-
itability’ of each route within a network is not considered
separately but the subsidy merely meets the gap between
revenues and costs. In between are the franchise systems
where there is (off-road) competition to run a collection
of services which may be profitable with no subsidy or
the bidding may be of the form of the minimum subsidy
to provide a specified level of service in a spatial area.
4.3 Implications for performance measurement
This section draws out the implications of the pre-
vious theory for performance measurement and relates
* Indeed, it is not difficult to show that the payoffs to workers of a public
company (in terms of wages or compensation for changes that might
bring about efficiency gains) will be a factor that affects the well-being of
elected representatives (in terms of their likelihood of being re-elected).
* The identification of the correct level of safety regulation is outside the
scope of this paper.
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this to ownership and institutional structures. The first
part relates to what is measured and the second to the pro-
pensity for public transport companies to become in-
volved with measurement.
The principal-agent framework suggests, in terms
of benchmarking, that it is important to take account of
the nature of ownership when comparing with peers as
ownership can have a significant impact on the impor-
tance of a particular indicator to a company. Indeed, the
theory also suggests that the indicators used to measure
efficient performance may vary depending on whether the
firm to be measured is in the private or public sector.
For private firms, concentration on output measures
(in particular those measures which look at the transla-
tion of inputs into outputs) is likely to be most satisfac-
tory as private sector firms will be driven by the profit
motive in some guise. For firms in the public sector, these
may not be agreed as suitable because of the greater com-
plexity of the principal-agent relationships. Indeed, it may
be difficult to agree a set of measures that all stakehold-
ers agree as important and a more widely based set of
indicators might be expected as an outcome.
Whilst the section on institutional framework above
is brief, it is sufficient to highlight the way in which dif-
ferent public transport operators have the incentive to
measure their performance. Whether in public or private
ownership, a company which lives in a world where the
public purse funds the gap between revenues and costs
without question, has no incentive to improve. At the
other extreme, a company which has no subsidy for com-
mercially operated routes and for whom subsidy has to
be bid for, has every incentive to measure and improve
their performance. If a private sector company is in this
position then improvement leads to higher profits or an
ability to attract more subsidies through contract bidding.
It is less clear to see what a public company might gain
from measuring performance on this simplistic level al-
though the empirical evidence is that public companies
often embark on performance measurement as a means
of justifying either their public status or their regulatory
framework.
5. THE ‘EMPIRICAL’ EVIDENCE: THE EQUIP
PROJECT AND SUBSEQUENT EXPERIENCES
This section draws on the experience of the EQUIP
project together with more recent experience with
benchmarking bus operators in the UK to provide some
empirical evidence for the theory discussed in the previ-
ous section.
5.1 The EQUIP Handbook
The final EQUIP Handbook is composed of two
parts. Part I contains the Method, which covers the back-
ground to benchmarking and the motivation for carrying
it out. Part II is divided into two sections: the list of in-
dicators in a format that is ready to be completed by the
users and accompanied by a separate Guide to Comple-
tion*. For this paper, the most interesting aspects are the
indicators and the lessons learnt from the project. As dis-
cussed above, the Handbook was validated by a cross-
European Network of operators**.
The EQUIP Handbook was designed to cover all
modes of public transport operator and contains 91 indi-
cators collated into eleven clusters as shown by Table 1
below***.
The literature research together with the interaction
with the EQUIP Network identified the problem that
many definitions are affected by cultural and institutional
or operating contexts. This meant that the EQUIP Hand-
book needed to define specific system definitions for the
purposes of the EQUIP indicators which formed an inte-
gral part of the Handbook.
Company Profile indicators (Cluster 1) provide the
background for selecting operators with which to bench-
mark as they describe how a company is organised and
the level of penetration within its operating area. The Ex-
ternal Influences on the Operator (Cluster 2) form a key
set of indicators for determining benchmarking partner-
ships. The influence of the outside world in which the
operator provides its service is significant for the perfor-
mance of the operator and thus has implications if
benchmarking is on an international level and the opera-
tors come from different market environments with vary-
ing degrees of regulation and subsidy.
Cluster 3, Revenue and Fare Structure, refers to the
indicators that define the fare structure of the operator. The
utilisation of vehicles and manpower is the key to the fis-
cal performance of a public transport operator (Cluster
4, Asset/Capacity Utilisation). The most important indica-
tors are those that consider how full the vehicles are, the
* Part I of the Handbook supports companies carrying out benchmarking.
It provides a reference document for the co-ordinator and it is not
essential reading for all those involved in data collection at a company.
The Guide is designed to be referred to whilst completing the indicators.
** In Austria, Eire, Finland, Italy, Netherlands and UK.
*** Indicators varied, as necessary, by mode:  There are five separate but
compatible Handbooks for each of the land-based modes (bus, trolley
bus, tram/light rail, Metro and local heavy rail).
IATSS RESEARCH Vol.27 No.2, 2003 • 23
THE ATTRACTIVENSS AND EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT – Is It Affected by the Nature of Ownership? – C. MULLEY, J. D. NELSON
time it takes for passengers to board the vehicle, the
utilisation of the fleet and the drivers, and the distance
travelled by vehicles that do not produce any revenue.
Even if an operator utilises its assets well, its per-
formance may be impeded by poor reliability in terms of
non-adherence to published schedules (Cluster 5). For
example, services may be delayed or abandoned at the
origin or during the journey or the operator may have
difficulty in maintaining the planned headway. Produc-
tion Cost indicators (Cluster 6) measure how efficiently
the operator is able to provide the service with the avail-
able resources and Company Performance indicators
(Cluster 7) chosen to give a broad overview as well as
trends over five years for indicators relating to patron-
age, the overall operating profit or loss, operating perfor-
mance, net profit margin and interest cover. Cluster 8
looks at technical performance in two ways: by measur-
ing indicators that directly affect on the road performance,
e.g. fuel consumption, emissions, vehicle breakdown and
failure and second, by monitoring the on-going mainte-
nance programme.
Most of the Employee Satisfaction measures (Clus-
ter 9) can be evaluated by the operator, using informa-
tion in the company records. In contrast, the best and
almost the only way to get relevant information about
Customer Satisfaction (Cluster 10) is to make a survey of
the current public transport passengers. Survey results can
be compared with the image that the operator has of its
performance simply by asking the operator to complete
the same questionnaires as the customers. In addition to
customer opinions, hard measure indicators are also rel-
evant for the benchmarking exercise, e.g. the number of
complaints and accessibility to vehicles in terms of, for
example, the % of vehicles with wheelchair access.
Table 2 The EQUIP super indicators
    Cluster and Name
Indicator Number
1.1 Subcontracting of services
1.3 Type of service area
1.4 Vehicle kilometres
1.6 Fleet composition
1.7 Passenger trips
1.15 Operating speed
2.9 External contributions to variable costs
3.3 Type of tickets
4.1 Load factor
4.2 Peak fleet utilisation
5.3 Abandoned service journeys
5.4 Delayed service journeys
6.2 Costs per employee
6.3 Costs per vehicle and passenger
7.1 Operating profit or loss
8.2 Emissions
8.3 Fleet reliability
9.1 Staff turnover
9.2 Sickness
10.1 Passenger feedback ratio
10.3 Vehicle accessibility
10.4 On board the vehicle
10.5 At the stations/stops
10.6 Information etc.
10.7 Transfers between vehicles
11.1 Incidents
11.3 Passenger health and safety
The Safety and Security (Cluster 11) covers the ac-
tual traffic safety of the operator and the safety of the
working environment. It shows the number of incidents
on the road, together with the number of injuries sustained
by drivers and passengers.
A subset of 27 ‘super’ indicators were chosen in
order to help operators with limited resources to begin
benchmarking - they are the ‘entry level’ set of indica-
tors and a response to the demand for a set of indicators
which would require a lower resource to complete. These
are shown in Table 2 above. These indicators were se-
lected because they are important to operators for
benchmarking their performance, they allow operators to
select suitable benchmarking partners and because they
have been found to be important in a survey of nine other
Table 1 EQUIP cluster titles and the number of indica-
tors
Cluster Cluster Number of Indicators
Title in Cluster
1 Company profile 21
2 External influences on operator 13
3 Revenue and fare structure 9
4 Asset/Capacity utilisation 8
5 Reliability 5
6 Production costs 3
7 Company performance 4
8 Technical performance 6
9 Employee satisfaction 12
10 Customer satisfaction 7
11 Safety and security 3
                            Total: 91
PUBLIC TRANSPORT VS PRIVATE TRANSPORT
24 • IATSS RESEARCH Vol.27 No.2, 2003
reports of benchmarking performance.
5.2 Results of the EQUIP project
EQUIP aimed to raise benchmarking awareness
through its activities and to create a network of local
transport operators and local authorities as a forum for
meeting key transport actors and to ensure that the work
in EQUIP was relevant to potential users. The EQUIP
Network was developed spanning the six European coun-
tries of the EQUIP partnership, as well as other EC coun-
tries and Eastern Europe once the final EQUIP Handbook
had been prepared. The first version of the Handbook was
developed and used by the EQUIP Network of operators
for self-assessment. The EQUIP Network thus offered the
opportunity to focus on a series of comparison procedures
amongst operators in order to identify the most suitable
indicators for measurement, both in terms of measuring
performance and suitable areas for improvement.
All data provision aspects of the EQUIP Network
were made under the umbrella of a very strong confiden-
tiality agreement which bound the research team, co-
ordinated by the University of Newcastle, to complete
confidence in relation to the data. As a result, it is not
possible to give detailed results of commercially sensi-
tive data in numerical terms. Moreover, operators taking
part helped the development of the EQUIP Handbook by
piloting the draft Handbook:  the final Handbook took
account of any difficulties which became evident at the
pilot stage. However, to give some flavour to the type of
operator involved, the Network included both small com-
panies (30 vehicles) and large companies (over 1,100 ve-
hicles) operating in both deregulated and regulated
markets in which the operators varied from having a mi-
nority to 100% of the market share in their operating area.
Operator responsibilities varied from being solely respon-
sible for providing services to being responsible for time-
table development and infrastructure provision and these
different operating environments meant that fare levels
and aspirations for the fare-box contribution to revenue
was diverse. This was also demonstrated in fairly wide
variation in peak fleet utilisation with the deregulated
companies demonstrating consistently higher peak usage.
Similarly there was high variation in the figures submit-
ted for non-revenue earning distance travelled by vehicles
in the fleet:  the privately owned companies in the de-
regulated environment displayed the lowest figures. Per-
haps most surprisingly was the very high variation in
vehicle maintenance which could only partly be explained
by differences in the age profile of fleets. The qualita-
tive and quantitative responses to the completion of the
Handbook by members of the EQUIP Network reinforced
the conclusions identified below: a nationally focussed
Handbook, thus standardising for operating environment,
with a third party to help collect, collate and undertake
quality control of the data, is a pre-requisite for good
benchmarking in local public transport. These aspects
have been carried forward in the UK based benchmarking
discussed in the next section.
Overall, the experiences of the Network highlighted
four important issues which are relevant to the develop-
ment of benchmarking in local public transport. First,
whilst operators in each country were overtly interested
in participating in benchmarking activities, many clearly
felt isolated at the start of a new exercise:  this emerged
during the National Workshops organised by EQUIP.
More seriously, the greatest problem facing opera-
tors in the EQUIP Network was the lack of resource –
time and manpower – to prioritise the establishment of
the necessary systems to collect and record data for the
Handbook. But perhaps the most serious disadvantage of
self-assessment is data quality control. Despite careful
detail in the definitions, it was unclear how many of the
operators actually read them:  comparison of data showed
clear simple errors (for example, using national currency
rather than the standard euro). This suggests that there
should be a third party who should check and collate data
for the set of companies who are benchmarking to en-
sure true comparison of like with like.
Throughout Europe there has been a trend towards
greater privatisation and more competition for public
transport services. This is reflected by rapid changes in
the character of companies. Such activities were seen ob-
stacles to benchmarking, e.g. company accounts and other
data are often reorganised, making it difficult to access
relevant data and to make internal comparisons over a
period of time. However, reorganisation could be re-
garded as an opportunity to introduce new systems such
as those required for benchmarking.
Whilst many of the indicators which depend on
monetary units were thought to be difficult to compare
at the European level where different operational and eco-
nomical environments exist, there were many indicators
which are well suited to just such trans-national compari-
son, for example the asset/capacity utilisation indicators.
This is, of course, a very important issue for international
benchmarking but one which evidence suggests that the
many difficulties are perceived rather than actual17.
In the context of this paper, it is worth noting that
none of the ‘big’ UK private bus companies joined the
EQUIP Network:  they participate in in-house benchmarking
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suggesting that private firms do have a greater incentive
to monitor performance. Outside the UK, all EQUIP Net-
work members were public sector owned:  the complexi-
ties of the stakeholder map may well explain the
difficulties of achieving agreement on which indicators
were particularly important and the lack of incentive to
produce the appropriate management information to com-
plete the Handbook. The UK Network included one small
private operator whose ability to complete the Handbook
was frustrated by lack of time resource but who com-
mented on the potential usefulness of the process.
5.3 More recent experience
Following EQUIP, a group of 15 UK bus operators,
all having similar characteristics, agreed to join to form
a bus benchmarking group. This has pioneered bus
benchmarking in the UK outside the big bus groups. The
work with this group has been designed to overcome the
problems identified by the EQUIP project.
All these companies operate in the same UK insti-
tutional framework, in the private sector and share simi-
lar evolutionary backgrounds as former publicly owned
companies (as described in Section 4.2 above). The
Transport Operations Research Group of the University
of Newcastle acted as the third party in facilitating the
process and holding the company data in confidence and
reporting – following the model of Imperial College in
its role as mentor for the Metro benchmarking. Initially,
the companies had diverse expectations from the
benchmarking process perhaps illustrating the effects of
their former background in the public sector:  for some
it was a defensive move to demonstrate good performance
to their shareholders whereas for others it was to iden-
tify the better elements of their peers and to learn from
best practice.
The process began by choosing and modifying ap-
propriate indicators from the EQUIP Handbook as it was
found that many of the indicator definitions were com-
promised by the European setting of the Handbook. A pi-
lot first year was undertaken which highlighted the
difficulties for some companies of providing comparable
information but also identified areas where there was po-
tential for a more in-depth focussing of attention.
Following the first year of benchmarking, this group
is continuing to benchmark but is also beginning the im-
provement cycle by undertaking a more in-depth study.
The first area of close scrutiny has been the engineering
part of the business, with 10 key indicators being derived
to focus methodically on vehicle and maintenance per-
formance as shown in Table 3 below:
Table 3 indicates the depth of the indicators being
discussed in this context:  the desire to concentrate on
these output related measures is consistent with what the
principal-agent theory discussed above would predict for
companies in the private sector, as is the next planned
area of detailed enquiry – that of productivity.
Whilst this study is still at an early stage, the ini-
tial results from each of the companies, held in confidence
by the research team, suggest that there are dramatic dif-
ferences in particular attributes between makes of ve-
Table 3 The key indicators for engineering
Title of Key Indicator Purpose Statement
Days off road for This KPI records days off road due to mechanical failure reflecting a number of potential causes
non-planned maintenance  including the effectiveness of planned maintenance (as a preventative measure), the reliability of the
vehicle category and the quality of manufacturer support (availability of parts and other support).
Abandoned service journeys This KPI is records the percentage of scheduled mileage not operated, broken down by reason.
Repeat defects This KPI identifies how often faults are not rectified on the first occasion. This may giver rise to
information on persistent problems which may be specific to a vehicle type or to a maintenance process.
Peak Vehicle Requirement This shows PVR and engineering spares in relation to the overall fleet, broken down by vehicle
(PVR) by vehicle type type.
Fuel consumption This KPI looks at fuel usage (kilometre per litre) both by fleet type and vehicle category.
Material cost This KPI indicates the material cost associated with vehicle categories.
Maintenance staff This KPI shows at a point in time the number of maintenance staff employed to maintain buses
relative to the fleet size and PVR.
Maintenance costs This KPI looks at the maintenance costs (not including running costs) per kilometre of operation.
Age profile This information will also be used in association with other indicators, since some engineering costs
may be age as well as vehicle related.
PCV pass rate This KPI will record the success rate at MOT.
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hicles. In addition there are differences in reliability
which can be quantified by the resources devoted to main-
tenance. This benchmarking group is beginning to ben-
efits of the cross pollination of best practice ideas
following this in-depth study and comparison between the
companies.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Performance measurement as a pre-requisite to per-
formance enhancement has been demonstrated in many in-
dustries. In essence, there is no demonstrable gains in
performance unless it is known where the starting point is.
Benchmarking is particularly appropriate as a tool
as it is engenders an expectation of continuous improve-
ment. However, with the notable exception of the metro
benchmarking and the internal benchmarking of the big
UK privatised bus companies and their subsidiaries, very
little serious benchmarking has been carried out in the
public transport sector.
The economic theory briefly considered in this pa-
per offers an explanation for the relative paucity of ac-
tivity in this area. The theory identifies that the
complexities of the stakeholder map make it more diffi-
cult for public sector companies to identify a narrow set
of key indicators which affect performance as compared
to private companies who will normally have profit as an
over-arching objective.
The theory also identifies the way in which the in-
stitutional framework will have an impact on the moti-
vation for performance measurement. Apart from EQUIP
Network which lasted for the duration of the EQUIP
project, the UK bus benchmarking group is the first of its
kind (in much the same way as the metro benchmarking
groups are also pioneers) and its emergence and continu-
ation has learnt from the lessons of EQUIP.
As a concluding note, whilst the EQUIP project
recognised the barriers to international benchmarking cre-
ated by differences in institutional environments, the eco-
nomic theory suggests that EQUIP might have been more
successful if it had recognised the different information
asymmetries embedded in different ownership structures
of public transport and designed indicators more suited to
their separate needs. Perhaps more importantly, future at-
tempts at encouraging performance measurement in the
public transport sector should embrace this information.
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